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Abstract: This paper argues the distributional effects of parametric pension 
reforms on saving and provides some evidence from Turkey. First, I 
develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which wealth 
distributions are initiated by an adverse demographic shock to the PAYG 
system. Unlike other empirical studies testing age-consumption profiles, I 
argue that, when transfers are used to balance the system, the significant 
difference between workers and retirees in terms of the marginal propensity 
to consume (MPC) can substantiate the negative effects of wealth 
redistribution on national saving. In the second part, I apply panel 
estimations by using microdata from the Household Budget Surveys 
conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 for more than 50,000 households. 
I show that, although the MPC is not higher for older generations, it is 
significantly higher for retirees than for workers. Even though confirming 
this fact alone does not promise a reduction in national saving, the results 
imply that, given the unparalleled generosity of the Turkish PAYG system 
and its significance in households’ budgets and as long as reforms 
redistribute wealth from workers to retirees, the recent parametric reforms 
should contribute to the current negative trend in national saving. 
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 Coupled with other structural problems in the economy, the severe financial 
crisis early in 1999 forced the Turkish government, led by the World Bank, to reform its 
impaired social security system in August 1999. This parametric reform, which was 
followed by several others, set a required minimum retirement age (absent before) and 
aimed to achieve an actuarial balance of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system as well as to 
reduce pressure on the borrowing needs of the government in the medium term. The 
distinction of the Turkish case comes from the fact that the Turkish retirement system is 
still one of the most generous social security systems in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) region, although it is insolvent. In 2004, a new 
member of the system had $74,000 average gross pension wealth with $2,510 per capita 
gross national income (GNP) where the same numbers were $183,000 and $35,430, 
respectively, for the U.S. (OECD, 2004). The cost of this generosity is being shifted onto 
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new generations by a mounting legacy debt. That is, the total deficit of the system 
accounted for 4.5 percent of the GNP in 2004, and the present value of the total 
resources used to finance the system’s deficit between 1990 and 2003 is almost equal to 
the GNP created in 2003 (Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2004). 
 Since 1999, there have been three major parametric reforms that fully affected 
only new entrants to the labor force. The reforms were phased in gradually so that the 
old members and retirees of the system were able to keep their previous pension 
entitlements unchanged. In June 2006, a third reform on Social Security and Health Care 
was legislated by the Turkish Parliament, which is expected to reduce the cumulative 
deficit to zero in 48 years.
1
 Despite the fact that the minimum age was increased to 65, 
many people will still be qualifying for retirement in their late 40s and early 50s until 
2040. As documented by Brook and Whitehouse (2006), even after three major reforms, 
the generosity of the pre-1999 system will continue to have a major impact on pension 
benefits for many decades to come. In other words, policy makers designed these 
reforms to keep the generous payments for current members intact so that the system’s 
long-term balance must be achieved by redistributing wealth from workers to retirees. 
 Many studies exist on how these reforms might provide a sustainable financial 
recovery; however, studies that investigate the direct effects of these parametric reforms 
on wealth distribution and aggregate saving are absent. This lack of interest might be due 
to the fact that the private saving rate in Turkey has been higher than the OECD average 
for the last 30 years. However, there has been a significant fall (20 percentage points of 
GDP) and a steady decline in the aggregate private saving rate since 2001, which is a 
particular concern for officials now (IMF, 2007).
2
 There is broad agreement that this 
trend stems from boosting confidence, relaxed liquidity constraints, increased political 
stabilization, and ―Ricardian‖ effects from increasing public saving after the post-2001 
recovery of the economy. 
 A large number of studies relate the intergenerational redistribution of wealth to 
national saving. In brief, unlike the infinite-horizon model, the life-cycle model implies 
that the time path of taxes has real impacts on the economy by changing the severity of 
tax distortion on different generations. It breaks the link between the horizon of private 
individuals and that of the government. If generational differences in the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) are significant, any public policy that redistributes wealth 
from younger generations to older generations causes national consumption to increase 
and saving to fall (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1983; Kotlikoff, 2003). 
 However, except for the windfall that the early generations receive at the 
introduction, if the implicit rate of return for the PAYG system is not different from 
what a private investment can earn, transfers by the system do not alter lifetime wealth 
for generations. Therefore, analyzing the distributional effects of existing PAYG 
systems on consumption requires an explicit model in which the system faces 
unexpected adverse shocks and the planner uses transfers to balance the system. In this 
paper, I argue that there are distributional effects of these parametric reforms on saving 
                                                 
1
 Since the Supreme Court has rejected the law, the reform did not take effect in January 2007. 
The court indicated that the rejected reform attempted to revoke the previous rights given to 
current members and retirees. Therefore, it is expected that the revised version of the reform that 
the government has been working on will be phased in over an extended period of time.  
2
 Even though it is not as sharp as in private saving, Turkey’s national saving has also been falling. 
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and provide some evidence from Turkey. 
 More specifically, in the first part of this paper, to show how parametric reforms 
may impact consumption (saving), I develop a two-period overlapping generations 
model in which wealth distributions are initiated by an adverse demographic shock to the 
PAYG system. Unlike other empirical studies testing age-consumption profiles, I argue 
that, when transfers are used to balance the system, the significant difference between 
workers and retirees in terms of the MPC can substantiate the negative effects of wealth 
redistribution on national saving. In the second part, I apply panel estimations by using 
microdata from the Household Budget Surveys conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 
for more than 50,000 households. I show that while the MPC is not higher for older 
generations, it is significantly higher for retirees than for workers. 
 Confirming this fact alone does not promise a reduction in national saving, 
particularly under developing country conditions. However, the results imply that, 
contrary to what many expect from these reforms and given the unparalleled generosity 
of the Turkish PAYG system and its significance in households’ budgets,3 as long as 
they redistribute the wealth from workers to retirees, the recent parametric reforms will 
contribute the current negative trend in national saving. 
 This paper relates to an extensive literature. Aydede (2008) analyzes the 
relationship between saving and social security in a time-series setting for Turkey by 
using the social security wealth (SSW) series calculated between 1970 and 2003. The 
results show that SSW, which is the biggest part of household wealth in Turkey, has 
robust and positive effects on aggregate consumption; therefore, it suppresses aggregate 
saving.
4
 Aggregate time-series studies (Feldstein, 1974; Barro, 1978; Engen and Gale, 
1997; Blake, 2004) have well-known shortcomings (Kotlikoff, 2003; Seidman, 1985) 
and therefore have been outnumbered by cross-section/panel studies testing the 
significance of the displacement between pension and non-pension wealth at the 
individual level.
5
 The major problem with these studies, however, is that they use 
information about households not about families, which does not distinguish transfers 
across generations from transfers across households.
6
 Therefore, a significant negative 
coefficient of SSW cannot answer whether pension wealth displaces non-pension wealth. 
 
This paper builds on the argument conceptualized by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) and 
Kotlikoff (2003) that, if generational differences in the MPC are significant, any public 
policy that redistributes wealth from younger generations to older generations causes 
national consumption to increase and saving to fall. The plan for the paper is as follows. 
Section 1 explains the model. The data and its sources are presented in Section 2. 
Empirical results are provided in Section 3. I discuss the findings in Section 4. 
                                                 
3
 It is expected that as SSW declines for younger generations they are more likely to increase their 
savings for retirement, which in turn may have a positive impact on national saving (IMF, 2007). 
4
 The estimated magnitude of this dissaving is around 24 percent for 2003. 
5
 The most recent study is Hurd, Michaud, and Rohwedder (2009). An extensive list of cross-
section studies can be found in the CBO Memorandum (1998) and Engen and Gale (1997). 
6
 For example, households with higher SSW could accumulate less non-pension wealth if they 
expect to have a bequest from their parents in the future. Cross-household transfers within an 
expanded family could make households with greater than average SSW accumulate less private 
wealth than otherwise would be the case. Likewise, a household with higher SSW could have 
higher non-pension wealth if its non-pension wealth includes inheritances. 
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1 The Model 
When a planner faces an adverse shock and decides on a parametric reform to secure the 
system, expectations about the future can deviate from what the planner promises—
depending on the sustainability of the actual policy in people’s eyes. To show formally 
how expectations on the pension system affect total consumption, I use a simple two-
period overlapping-generations model where there is no productive capital and identical 
individuals are endowed by w. They save (s) in the first period, then retire and spend their 
saving in the second period. There is no uncertainty in their lifetime, liquidity constraints, 
bequests, or growth in endowments. To avoid defining the utility function explicitly, I 
assume that the real interest rate (r) is equal to the personal discount rate (ρ). The planner 
runs a balanced PAYG system where the young, y, pay taxes, τ, and the seniors, o, 
receive benefits, b. In all periods …, t  2, t  1, there exists a steady state with 
 
(1)                                             ,)1(  nbLRb   
 
R and L stand for the numbers of retirees (the old) and the workers (the young), 
respectively, and the population grows by n, which is the implicit rate of return (IRR) of 
the system. In period t there is an adverse demographic shock (θ), so that nt = n  θt. 
Consequently, the budget of the pension system changes to 
 
(2)                                            ).)(1( sttt nb    
 
The government uses tax surcharges (τs) and splits the fiscal burden θtτ between existing 
generations at time t so that elderly and young cohorts have to bear a share 1 δt and δt, 
respectively. Consequently, we have 
 
(3)                                               .)1(  ttt bb   
 
Substituting (3) into (2) and using the definition for b (1), we can derive 
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Note that if δt = 1 we have bt = b so that the old in t bear no burden from the shock. In 
this sense, when an adverse shock hits, the planner’s decision on δ becomes a parametric 
reform for the existing PAYG system and constitutes unexpected wealth transfers among 
generations similar to those at the system’s introduction point, where the initial seniors 
receive a windfall. 
 From the individual’s perspective, shocks are recognized when the young are 
required to pay tax surcharges (τs), and they form their expectations on δ in the first 
period determined by the planner in the second period. Formally, every young person 
who is required to pay taxes and tax surcharges maximizes 
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If the utility function satisfies the conventional conditions and ρ = r, the young at time t 
solves this problem with the following values: 
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Given that all individuals recognize that the planner commits to a balanced budget (2), 
the young’s expectation about benefits at t becomes: 
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Assuming that Etθt+1 = 0 and using (4), we obtain 
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Using (8) and the fact that ),1()1( 1 tt nn    (7) becomes 
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Substituting (9) and (4) into (5), we obtain 
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Likewise, the old also face the following consumption function at time t: 
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Because Et-1θt = 0 and )1(1 nbE tt  , when we substitute (2) for bt, (11) becomes: 
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By using (10) and (12), the marginal effect of the transfer policy on the total 
consumption, yttottt cLcRC  , can be observed as follows: 
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where, as shown in (10) and (12), MPCs out of transfers (δθτ) for the old and the young 
are one and (1+r)/{(2+r)(1+nθt)}, respectively. When we use 1)1(  ttt LnL   with 
Lt-1 (i.e., Rt) normalized to one, (13) becomes 
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Note that the first term in the brackets, the difference between MPCs, is always positive, 
and the sign of (14) depends on the sign of the second expression in the brackets. There 
are three possible cases. First, if the transfer is born by the current young generation, 
(Etδt+1 = 0), a wealth redistribution will increase consumption by θτ/(2+r). Second, if the 
transfer is shifted onto unborn generations and the policy is binding, that is, Etδt+1 = δt, 
consumption will rise by {(2+nθt)(θτ)}/(2+r). Third, if the system promises generous 
but unsustainable SSW by setting δ close to one with an unbinding transfer policy, 
consumption may even decline. The diversion between expectations and the actual policy 
becomes more likely as each generation faces increasing tax surcharges (or rising public 
debt) in the face of cumulating shocks. Consequently, a binding policy (a constant δ) 
grows to be unsustainable, as implied by (14) below. 
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which has to be less than or equal to (w-τ). This brings up a possibility that the planner 
may decide to end the program (gradually or all at once) so that the expectation about the 
policy variable (δ) can realistically be lower than zero. This brings up a theoretical 
ambiguity on how a Ponzi-scheme like PAYG affects consumption. 
 It is obvious from (10) and (12) that when n    > r SSW becomes positive, and, 
using (14), aggregate consumption, yttottt cLcRC  , can be expressed by 
 
15)(                              ),,,,,( 1 ttttttt XdMPCESSWwfC    
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where dMPC is the difference between MPCs of the old and the young and X is the 
vector of other factors, such as housing wealth, financial wealth, liquidity constraints, and 
so on, that may affect consumption. This representation is also consistent with traditional 
life-cycle models investigating the same subject (Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Barro, 
1974; Feldstein, 1974). 
 In short, as summarized by (15), the short-run effect of any generational transfer 
on total consumption depends on two things. One, the difference between marginal 
propensities to consume (out of transfers) for retirees and workers. Two, the aggregated 
effect of the generational policy on the expectations of workers at t. Therefore, the key to 
understanding if a public policy that redistributes resources between generations affects 
national saving requires answers to the following three empirical questions. First, does 
the system redistribute wealth through parametric reforms? Second, is there a significant 
difference between workers and retirees in terms of MPC? Third, what are the 
expectations of the new members in the system? 
 The first and the third questions have been discussed by many researchers (The 
World Bank, 2000; IMF. 2000; Brook and Whitehouse, 2006; Aydede, 2008; TUSIAD, 
2004). The consensus being that the Turkish PAYG system is one of the worst social 
security systems in the world in terms of generational fairness, which results in a 
declining trend in expected SSW for new members of the system between 1970 and 
2003. The next section answers the second question. 
2 Data 
In the absence of rich panel data, studies on consumption and saving usually build a 
―pseudo-panel‖ to disentangle age effects from cohorts and time effects to observe life-
cycle profiles of consumption.
7
 In contrast, we specifically seek to uncover differences in 
consumption profiles at any given time distinguished by age and work status. Therefore, 
we want to preserve cohort/time effects in our study. The variation in the MPC that we 
want to observe comes from work status that may coincide with a declining lifespan as 
one gets older so that younger generations can be workers and the older generations 
retirees. This provides us with a convenient opportunity to use pooled cross-section data. 
 
                                                 
7
 Most recent studies are Borsch-Supan (2003), Deaton and Paxson (2000), and Demeary and 
Duck (2004). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
R W R W R W R W
Number of Households 4,496 9,835 1,487 3,367 1,446 3,231 1,459 3,456
Includes Workers/Retirees 20% 3% 17% 3% 18% 4% 18% 3%
Average Age 60.58 39.39 60.32 39.88 61.03 39.56 61.09 39.98
Male 96% 98% 94% 98% 94% 98% 95% 98%
Married 93% 97% 90% 97% 90% 97% 91% 96%
Urban 82% 80% 82% 78% 82% 78% 83% 76%
Education 33% 59% 37% 59% 34% 56% 34% 57%
Disposable Income 826 1,040 1,030 1,320 1,188 1,493 1,309 1,703
Total Consumption 729 830 923 1,040 1,132 1,267 1,262 1,597
Nondurables 648 720 795 875 950 1,024 1,099 1,372
Durables 81 110 128 165 182 243 163 225
Transfers (% of Dis. Inc.) 66.20% 4.11% 65.04% 5.15% 66.01% 5.52% 66.97% 5.46%
Real Estate 154,000 135,000 171,000 154,000 207,198 187,823 238,448 211,073
2003 2004 2005 2006
Average Values of HH (000.000 TL)
 
Note: R and W stand for Retirees and Workers, respectively. 
 
We use the raw data from the Household Budget Survey conducted each year from 2003 
to 2006 by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) in Turkey.
8
 Each survey has three 
parts: information on each household’s general characteristics, information on each 
household’s consumption, and information on income, demographics, and employment 
status of each individual in each household.
9
 They are the most recent and nationally 
representative household surveys, covering a sample of 25,920 households for 2003, 
8,600 for 2004, 8,640 for 2005 and 2006. They were randomly chosen from all parts of 
Turkey by the stratified multi-stage systematic cluster sampling method satisfying the 
OECD’s standards.10 We define two groups, workers and retirees, and 10 age cohorts in 
each survey. The summary of surveys for each categorization is given in Table 1 above 
and Table 2 below. 
 
                                                 
8
 Technical details of the surveys can be found at the TUIK’s web page: www.tuik.gov.tr. 
9
 Very detailed information on consumption and income is the unique characteristic of the surveys. 
For example, the surveys provide data on more than 200 different types of consumption 
expenditures. 
10
 This is not applicable to earlier surveys conducted in 2002, 1994, and 1987. 
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Figure 1: Age Profiles of Income, Consumption, and Illiquid Wealth
11
 
1
9
.4
1
9
.6
1
9
.8
2
0
2
0
.2
2
0
.4
20 40 60 80
headage
Income Consumption
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
ln
a
v
re
a
l
20 40 60 80
Head Age
 
 
The group of retirees includes households whose heads are retired, not working, and are 
receiving public annuity payments from one of the three public social security 
institutions.
12
 If the head of the household is currently employed and covered by one of 
the public schemes, the household is classified in the group of workers. We define 
regions whose population is more than 20,000 as urban. Lastly, the threshold for 
education is elementary or higher school degree. A quick visual inspection shows the 
importance of public social security in the retirees’ lives: almost two-thirds of their 
disposable income comes from transfer payments. Another interesting point is the fact 
that retirees seem to have more wealth in real estate than workers.
13
 
 As seen in Figure 1 above, which uses the pooled data,
14
 disposable income, and 
consumption increase in early ages and fall as the head of the household gets older, while 
wealth in real estate (mostly housing) does not show the same trend. This can be 
explained by capital market imperfections and prevailing bequest motives in extended 
families. These factors may also amplify the difference between workers and older 
individuals in terms of the MPC. Uncertainty in the absence of private annuity markets 
breaks the link between today and the future and leads to high personal discounts for 
future earnings in younger ages. Therefore, as they get older (or approach retirement), 
individuals consider taxes paid in the past as ―sunk‖ and annuity payments as 
―unexpected,‖ which may not be bequeathed but consumed by older individuals. As a 
result, it would be likely to observe an increasing trend in the MPC out of income (out of 
liquid wealth), while individuals may not be able to dissave as they get older. 
 
                                                 
11
The graphs use average values in logs. 
12
 A retired household head who keeps working is not included in this group. 
13
 Real estate wealth represents a perceived value. 
14
 We deflated the values to 2003 by using the consumer price index. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Age Cohorts 
0-25 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
Number of Households 690 3,477 5,986 7,043 7,502 6,393 6,393 4,419 3,304 6,753
Demographics of HHH
Average Age 22.37 27.33 31.99 37.01 41.81 46.88 51.87 56.65 61.7 71.03
Male 84% 94% 95% 94% 94% 92% 91% 88% 86% 81%
Married 38% 92% 96% 95% 94% 92% 90% 87% 83% 74%
Urban 78% 81% 77% 73% 73% 71% 70% 66% 63% 62%
Employed 75% 92% 93% 92% 88% 75% 60% 48% 39% 26%
LFPR 79% 95% 96% 95% 92% 78% 62% 50% 40% 26%
Education 56% 56% 51% 44% 43% 39% 34% 28% 18% 13%
Covered Worker 37% 61% 59% 60% 58% 42% 25% 12% 7% 3%
Uncovered Worker 51% 33% 36% 35% 34% 44% 59% 76% 83% 87%
Retired 2% 2% 4% 5% 11% 34% 55% 70% 74% 80%
HH has
Private Pension/Health Ins. 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Car 8% 17% 24% 28% 32% 32% 33% 28% 19% 13%
Sick Member 13% 12% 16% 19% 25% 29% 38% 43% 51% 57%
Housing Debt 49% 56% 59% 57% 56% 56% 54% 49% 40% 31%
Access to Financial Markets 17% 25% 31% 29% 31% 31% 29% 23% 16% 10%
Average Values of HH (000.000 TL.)
Disposable Income 545 691 759 811 908 975 1,000 908 822 730
Total Consumption 510 582 645 681 764 809 821 731 646 574
Transfers (% of Dis. Inc.) 25% 6% 5% 5% 7% 16% 24% 33% 34% 39%
Wealth in Real Estate 52,200 51,400 73,100 117,000 151,000 153,000 193,000 170,000 183,000 161,000
 
 
The summary of the four surveys by age cohorts is given in Table 2 above, where several 
important points are worth mentioning. Due to the lack of a required minimum retirement 
age and easy early retirement opportunities through disability,
15
 all age groups include 
retired households, and their share reaches 11 percent at age 40–44 and 34 percent at age 
45–50. Moreover, the proportion of households who work without social security 
coverage is higher than 33 percent for all age groups and increases for older cohorts 
because of the existence of an implicit tax penalty for retirees who keep working in 
formal sectors. Interestingly, labor-force participation rates for household heads are much 
higher than the national average, which is around 55 percent. 
 
                                                 
15
 The minimum retirement age is set at 58 by the reform in 1999. 
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Figure 2: Average Age of Household Head by Age of Individual for 2003 
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The surveys in our study collect information on consumption for households not for 
individuals.
16
 This represents a particular problem in developing countries where the 
oldest members in extended families are usually referred to as household heads, even if 
they are not the primary income earners. For example, a single 70-year-old father who 
receives only a retirement income can be shown as the head of a multigenerational 
household in surveys while actually other members at different lifecycle stages make 
consumption and income decision for the family. To understand the bias that this problem 
might introduce to age-consumption profiles, we plot the average age of each individual’s 
household head against the individual’s age in Figure 2 above. 
 If everyone were a household head, the graph would plot a 45-degree line. In 
general, the plot that lies above the 45-degree line indicates that young adults live with 
their parents. While the disconnection between the household head’s and the individual’s 
age gets worse at ages before 30 and after 70, it is not so dramatic between these ages. As 
argued by Deaton and Paxson (2000), this evident bias affects the estimation by 
smoothing differences in the MPC particularly for ages below 30 and above 70. 
3 Differences in MPC 
Even though the specification of conventional consumption functions has become 
increasingly more sophisticated over the years, a typical study investigating age-
consumption profiles tests changes in consumption due to changes in income, wealth, 
expectations, and other control variables. As stated before, our empirical objective is to 
test whether there is a significant difference in MPCs of retirees and workers that 
substantiates the negative impact of redistribution through parametric reforms as shown 
by (15) above. Consequently, our estimating framework takes the following form: 
 
                                                 
16
 Even though there are ways to estimate consumption at the individual level from household 
information, the estimations usually use household consumption by the age of household heads 
rather than by the age of individuals. 
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(16)                                       ,'210 iiiii uZPDIREc    
 
where RE and PDI represent the total assets in real estate and personal disposable income 
(including all forms of net government transfers), respectively. Z is a set of dummy 
variables, which we will define later in the regression analysis. The subscript i stands for 
each household and u is for the factors that may have effects on consumption but not 
defined in the function. 
 In estimating β2 in Equation (16), we control the size of households by finding 
values for per-adult equivalent persons adjusted by the OECD’s equivalent scale.17 To see 
the sensitivity of this selection, we also estimate the same regressions by (1) including the 
number of persons living in the same household as a separate variable, and (2) calculating 
per-person values by dividing household values by the number of people living in the 
household for each year. In addition, because the selection of household heads is left to 
family members during the surveys, we reassign the position of head of the household to 
the primary income earners in each household and reestimate the regressions. To control 
for the other factors that might influence the households’ consumption behavior, we use 
the following dummy variables: 
 
Education = 1, if HHH’s education is higher than elementary school 
Indebt   = 1, if HH has a financial debt in housing 
AFM                = 1, if anybody in the HH has a credit card and/or financial assets 
Sex   =  1, if HHH is male 
Car   = 1, if HH has a car 
Married = 1, if HHH is married 
Sick   =  1, if anybody in HH is sick and under continuous treatment 
Life   = 1, if HH has private life and/or health insurance 
Urban              = 1, if HH lives in a region that has a population of more than 
20,000 people 
Employed  = 1, if HHH has a paying job 
Retired   =  1, if HHH receives retirement benefits from a public social  
   security scheme 
Informal  =  1, if HHH has a paying job without public social security  
   coverage 
 
where HH and HHH represent household and household head, respectively. Specifically, 
we define a dummy variable, Car, because we expect transportation costs with very high 
gas prices to affect the households’ consumption decisions. In addition, we control the 
households’ ability to access financial markets and their willingness to reduce risk 
exposure by two separate variables: AFM and Life. 
 
The main explanatory, disposable household income, covers the last 12 months and 
includes all cash and in-kind earnings, unearned income from financial investments, all 
                                                 
17
 The OECD scale assumes that the first adult’s weight is 1, other adults have weight of 0.7, and 
the children have a weight of 0.5. 
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transfers from private and public resources, and imputed rent for owner-occupied 
dwellings, net of taxes and adjusted by the consumer price index. Consumption, on the 
other hand, covers the last month’s expenditures on nondurable goods and services and 
includes the value of one-twelfth of the durable goods. In addition to purchased items, it 
also includes gifts, donations, fringe benefits from employers, and consumption from the 
household’s own productions. We take the monthly average of annual disposable 
household income in all regressions. Table 3 below summarizes the regression results for 
all years using per-adult values adjusted by the OECD equivalent scales. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results for MPC 
Cohorts C1 C2 C3 HHH C1 C2 C3 HHH C1 C2 C3 HHH C1 C2 C3 HHH
0-25  0.57  0.68  0.51  0.51  0.71  0.79  0.39  0.65  0.59  0.69  0.56  0.55  0.49  0.47  0.55  0.55 
25-29  0.36  0.45  0.24  0.33  0.62  0.73  0.46  0.62  0.73  0.82  0.63  0.69  0.51  0.49  0.55  0.35 
30-34  0.45  0.53  0.39  0.41  0.23  0.26  0.23  0.26  0.43  0.48  0.38  0.41  0.60  0.55  0.31  0.31 
35-39  0.53  0.57  0.47  0.54  0.26  0.31  0.23  0.26  0.50  0.70  0.35  0.69  0.61  0.62  0.61  0.57 
40-44  0.50  0.54  0.45  0.52  0.54  0.56  0.52  0.53  0.23  0.26  0.22  0.30  0.41  0.41  0.32  0.39 
45-49  0.36  0.49  0.34  0.41  0.42  0.45  0.38  0.40  0.60  0.64  0.54  0.53  0.60  0.52  0.51  0.54 
50-54  0.44  0.47  0.38  0.42  0.44  0.45  0.48  0.41  0.48  0.54  0.40  0.42  0.39  0.54  0.40  0.54 
55-59  0.33  0.41  0.23  0.30  0.39  0.44  0.44  0.39  0.33  0.32  0.35  0.39  0.40  0.39  0.45  0.40 
60-64  0.15  0.14  0.22  0.22  0.30  0.39  0.12  0.19  0.52  0.60  0.48  0.40  0.48  0.61  0.49  0.41 
65+  0.22  0.30  0.16  0.23  0.60  0.65  0.51  0.42  0.59  0.66  0.56  0.45  0.44  0.46  0.36  0.35 
2003 2004 2005 2006
Notes: C1, C2, and C3 represent three different methods of controlling household size: per adult 
equivalent values by OECD scales (C1), per person values (C2), and unadjusted values with 
household size as a separate variable (C3). We also reestimated the regressions by giving headship 
to the member whose income was the highest. The results are given under HHH. All coefficients 
are significant at 1 percent confidence level with robust standard errors. 
 
Figure 3: MPC by Age Groups 
 
 
The first thing to observe is that older age cohorts do not have consistently higher MPCs 
than younger cohorts. In fact, as shown in Figure 3 above, there is a reverse trend in 
2003. However, this result should be taken cautiously. First of all, the expected u-shaped 
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MPC pattern covers an individual’s lifespan, which, unlike ours, needs a cohort analyses 
rather than a single-year test. Second, as explained before, because we use information on 
households, the coefficients underestimate the true MPC for older age cohorts. Finally, 
Turkey has very young retirement ages due to the lack of minimum retirement age and 
easy early retirement options through the disability coverage.
18
 There are a significant 
number of retirees in every age group who mostly work in widespread informal sectors 
because of tax penalties for retirees who keep working. Even though we control for these 
factors in the regression, they still impact age-consumption profiles. 
 Except for the first age group, having a car, access to financial markets, and 
living in urban areas have significant and positive effects on consumption (results are not 
shown). Consistent with the effect of real estate wealth on consumption, financial debt in 
housing does not have a significant impact on consumption for most age groups, and it 
becomes negative for older age groups. The insignificant effect of marriage and sex on 
consumption may come from the negligible share of female and/or single household 
heads similar to households with private life/health insurance. As expected, retirement 
affects consumption positively at older ages. Interestingly, employment status has no 
consistent signs for all age groups and no significant effect on consumption. This can be 
explained by the widespread existence of extended families where the household head’s 
income is only a small fraction of the total household income. Although it is not 
significant, having to work in an informal sector in later ages has negative effects on 
consumption. Finally, as our results imply, having an elementary or higher school degree 
always pays back. 
 If the social security system has well-defined age requirements and rules for 
retirement eligibility, as in most developed countries, age-consumption profiles may 
coincide with work status profiles. However, when there is no minimum retirement age 
and more than half of the adult population is out of a labor force whose large portion 
works in informal sectors, a distributive aspect of a PAYG system should be analyzed 
between workers and retirees of the system. Table 5 shows the test results of 
consumption profiles for workers and retirees. 
                                                 
18
 As young as 47 for men and 38 for women, the lowest in the world (The World Bank, 2000). 
The average minimum retirement ages for OECD countries are 64.4 for men and 63.9 for women 
in 2002 (OECD, 2002). 
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Table 5: Regression Results with OECD Equivalent Scales 
Income 0.4743 0.000 0.32934 0.000 0.56236 0.000 0.34653 0.000
Real Estate 1.80E-05 0.854 8.33E-05 0.342 2.45E-04 0.035 2.04E-04 0.294
Education 4.30E+07 0.000 4.83E+07 0.000 4.32E+07 0.005 6.10E+07 0.000
Sex -7.89E+07 0.001 -8.61E+07 0.026 -2.93E+05 0.994 -1.12E+08 0.011
Married 1.28E+06 0.924 5.38E+07 0.011 3.71E+07 0.223 6.25E+07 0.172
Urban 3.95E+07 0.000 4.08E+07 0.000 -2.13E+07 0.176 -5.59E+07 0.000
Car 8.10E+07 0.000 8.77E+07 0.000 6.66E+07 0.000 8.59E+07 0.000
Indebt -1.59E+05 0.981 6.68E+06 0.285 -4.61E+07 0.022 -2.02E+07 0.168
Sick 2.04E+07 0.002 1.85E+06 0.783 4.95E+07 0.122 2.44E+07 0.233
AFM 4.20E+07 0.001 6.10E+07 0.000 1.38E+08 0.012 6.12E+07 0.000
Life 2.01E+07 0.735 1.79E+08 0.000 7.53E+07 0.000 5.37E+07 0.000
cons 1.55E+08 0.000 1.72E+08 0.000 1.12E+08 0.046 2.72E+08 0.000
# of obs.
F
R-squared
C2 0.51068 0.00 0.35781 0.00 0.61032 0.00 0.36765 0.00
C3 0.43087 0.00 0.31001 0.00 0.5189 0.00 0.31244 0.00
HHH 0.46251 0.00 0.30925 0.00 0.48254 0.00 0.32001 0.00
Income 0.554 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.525 0.000 0.432 0.000
Real Estate 0.000 0.252 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.679 0.000 0.247
Education 60.890 0.003 115.840 0.000 89.060 0.001 93.270 0.000
Sex -154.460 0.014 -216.550 0.050 -45.810 0.225 -259.420 0.004
Married -32.050 0.374 88.350 0.153 -29.800 0.232 4.470 0.936
Urban -1.320 0.955 77.070 0.000 68.510 0.000 45.320 0.007
Car 129.470 0.000 143.160 0.000 142.120 0.000 155.140 0.000
Indebt 12.570 0.588 -21.430 0.190 40.320 0.067 8.170 0.580
Sick 88.290 0.015 31.560 0.484 113.590 0.033 34.850 0.165
AFM 41.510 0.431 -16.200 0.282 149.030 0.019 4.160 0.792
Life 41.710 0.011 79.790 0.000 69.560 0.000 61.030 0.000
cons 272.170 0.000 316.970 0.005 115.050 0.028 377.050 0.000
# of obs.
F
R-squared
C2 0.5908 0.00 0.4377 0.00 0.6267 0.00 0.4508 0.000
C3 0.5183 0.00 0.3279 0.00 0.4203 0.00 0.4267 0.000
HHH 0.5209 0.00 0.3311 0.00 0.4922 0.00 0.4134 0.000
0.4942 0.4323 0.4035 0.4703
1446 3231 1459 3456
32.46 75.99 36.21 79.09
0.5356 0.4374 0.5189 0.4463
2005 2006
4,496 9,835 1487 3367
101.39 190.81 41.64 73.59
2003 2004
Retirees Workers Retirees Workers
Notes: I use robust standard errors. The probability that the coefficient is not different from zero is 
given next to each coefficient. C2, C3, and HHH are defined before. Since the values in 2005 are 
expressed in YTL (1YTL = 1,000,000 TL), the coefficients are smaller. 
 
 
Unlike age-consumption profiles, retirees have higher MPCs than workers in all four 
years, and the cross differences are significant at the 1 percent level. This outcome is not 
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sensitive to the method of controlling household size and the selection of household 
heads. Because we classify households according to the head’s work status, similar to the 
bias in age-consumption profiles, we may have households, for example, whose heads are 
retired but the rest are workers. As the figures in Table 1 show, almost 20 percent of 
retired households have one or more workers, while it is 4 percent for workers with at 
least one retiree in the household. In order to see its effect on estimations, we reestimated 
the regressions by controlling whether a retired (worker) household has a worker 
(retiree). The results show that controlling it increases the MPC for retirees but does not 
affect workers. 
 In addition, the regression results reveal important information about the other 
factors that affect consumption. For example, even though its sign is positive, a perceived 
value of wealth in real estate does not have significant effects on consumption, perhaps 
due to imperfect capital markets and the fact that income from dwellings plus imputed 
rents are in already disposable income. As expected, higher education or having a car is 
indicative of higher spending. The effect of access to financial markets on consumption 
has a consistent positive sign for all years but only significant for 2003 and 2004. 
Interestingly, while location of household has a significant and positive effect on 
consumption for workers, it has negative but insignificant effects for retirees.  
4 Conclusion 
Turkey is a unique case in the literature due to its very generous but unsustainable social 
security system. Since 1999, there have been three major parametric reforms aimed at 
correcting the system’s long-term balance. All of the three reforms used a phased-in 
approach to sustaining the long-run financial viability of the program. The duration of 
this recovery, after three major reforms, will be more than 50 years. There is no doubt 
that the reforms constitute significant wealth distribution from workers to retirees during 
this period; the magnitude of which has been calculated by Brook and Whitehouse 
(2006). There have been many studies debating actuarial and financial aspects of these 
reforms, except for their impacts on economic dynamics. 
 This paper is the first of its kind that attempts to assess the distributional effects 
of parametric PAYG reforms on saving in Turkey. I first develop a two-period 
overlapping generations model where wealth distribution is initiated by an adverse shock 
to a PAYG system. Unlike other empirical studies looking for differences in age-
consumption profiles, we argue that, when transfers are used to balance the system with 
no required minimum retirement age, an increase in total consumption critically depends 
on differences in the MPC of workers and retirees rather than those of age cohorts. 
Using a very large data set including more than 50,000 households collected by the 
Household Budget Survey over four years from 2003 to 2006, we test the MPC of age-
cohorts as well as that of workers and retirees. Our results are robust and indicate that, 
while the MPC is not higher for older generations, it is significantly higher for retirees 
than for workers. 
 
Although this fact has been confirmed, it does not promise a reduction in national 
saving. The results imply that, as long as parametric reforms constitute wealth transfers 
from workers to retirees, the recent parametric reforms will contribute to the current 
negative trend in national saving. 
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